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Abstract 
This study investigates if and how different episodes of large net inflows – export 
boom, remittances, FDIs, or aid – caused Dutch disease in Latin American countries. 
We investigate this disease – i.e. the decline of manufacturing output – with special 
reference to the channels through which it works, to the crisis period and to the role of 
China for LAC. The study conducts analyses at the 3-digit International Standard 
Industrial Classification level for manufacturing industries. Our results robustly 
suggest that export, aid and remittances booms may indeed have an adverse impact on 
the rate of growth of exportable industries. The exchange rate overvaluation has proven 
to be the channel through which these capital booms induced decline of manufacturing 
output growth, but only after the work monetary and fiscal policies is considered. The 
crisis likely softened the Dutch disease effects in LAC. We find China exporting 
manufactures to some of the LAC does not significantly affect the manufacturing 
growth of other fellow LAC, but depending on the type of manufacture industry 
and country considered China may play a negative or positive role for LAC’s 
manufacturing through the work on third-market competition: Mexican 
manufacturing suffering significant negative impacts while for the rest of Latin 
American countries studied the effect of China may be positive. 
 
Keywords: Dutch disease, manufacturing value added, excess appreciation, Latin 
America.  
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1. Introduction 
Countries that have grown rapidly in the past thirty (East Asia and the Pacific) have done so 
developing their manufacturing industries and having an export-oriented production, while in 
the past few years (1995-2007) in Latin American countries (hereafter LAC) manufacturing 
de-industrialized and reached just a modest per capita GDP growth– despite policy efforts to 
protect and develop these industries (See UNIDO 2013, chapter 1, and UN WIDER 2013).  
Indeed, as Figure 1 suggests, the decline of LAC manufacturing has been likely faster 
than that of the remaining developing world: since mid-1980s, the share of manufacturing value 
added in GDP in LAC fell by about a third, compared to a decline of less than 10% in the 
remaining developing world; and, in the last decade, the average growth rate in manufacturing 
value added in LAC decelerated from 4.3 percent (in the period 2003-2007) to 1.4 percent 
(2007-2012), more than in any other region of the world (See Figure 2). Although the 2008 
world economic crisis may explain the reduction in growth around the world in late 2000s, 
there seems to be more on the story for LAC. 
 
Figure 1 – Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) in LAC 
 
   Source: World Development Indicators 
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Figure 2 - Manufacturing value added growth rate, by region, 2007–2012 
 
 
Source: UNIDO, Industrial Development Report 2013, Sustaining Employment Growth: The Role of Manufacturing and Structural 
Change, p. 179, table 10.6. 
 
 
At the same time, in the last two decades, several Latin American countries experienced 
episodes of large net foreign inflows either through oil/mineral export boom, other 
commodities export booms, remittances, FDIs, or aid.1 Table 1 shows that in the last twenty 
years exports represent a considerable and increasing share of GDP. For instance, for 
Argentina, export share in GDP increases from 6.7 percent (1990-1995) to 22.7 (2002-2007) 
to 18.8 (2008-2011) percent, or for Bolivia in the same periods, from 16.6 to 27.7 and to 37.8 
percent, respectively. In almost all of these countries the top-ten export products explain most 
of these shares. Among the top-ten exports products are commodities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Some LACs have been on and off recipients of other types of inflows, namely, portfolio inflows (equity and 
debt). But we do not consider those inflows as they are rather volatile and tied to short-run issues. Here the concern 
is with medium-/long-run issues of manufacturing growth. 
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Table 1 - Net Inflows in LAC, 1990-2011 (Share of GDP; average per 6-year period, %) 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from UN (COMTRADE) and WB (WDI). 
Notes: 1) n.a. = not available. 2) For Panama (2002-2005). 3) Notice that the last period includes the 2008 world economic crisis that greatly 
affected exports around the world. 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from CEPAL (CEPALSTAT). 
Notes: 1) For Panama (2008-2009). For Uruguay (2008-2010). 2) Notice that the last period includes the 2008 world economic crisis that 
impacted negatively commodity trade around the world. 
 
Net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Period AR BO BR CH CO EC MX PN PR UR 
1990-1995 1.31 2.19 0.27 1.92 0.95 1.61 1.63 2.47 2.36 0.76 
1996-2001 2.91 9.37 3.46 4.24 2.32 2.17 2.90 7.38 3.25 0.95 
2002-2007 1.86 2.35 1.40 3.90 2.62 1.64 2.37 7.45 3.37 4.12 
2008-2012 1.64 2.89 2.22 2.73 2.12 0.79 0.86 7.35 4.43 5.77 
Source: Own calculations using data from CEPAL (CEPALSTAT). 
Note: 1) For Panama (2008-2010). For Peru (2008-2011). For Uruguay (1993-1995). 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from WB, WDI. 
 
Net Remittances 
Period AR BO BR CH CO EC MX PN PR UR 
1990-1995 -0.05 -0.08 0.30 -0.02 1.09 0.81 1.11 1.32 0.53 - 
1996-2001 -0.05 0.81 0.21 -0.02 1.07 4.25 1.45   0.32  1.00 0.20 
2002-2007 0.07 3.18 0.35 0.00 2.50 5.56 2.46 0.27 1.51 0.42 
2008-2011 -0.06 4.98 0.12 0.00 1.58 4.01 2.26 -0.26 1.67 0.28 
Source: Own calculations using data from WB (WDI) and IMF (IFS). 
Notes: 1) Net Remittances refers to personal remittances received minus personal remittances paid. Thus a negative number means a net 
outflow of remittances. 2) For Chile personal remittances received were zero from 1991 to 1999. 3) For Uruguay personal remittances paid 
were zero in 2002. From 1998 to 2001 data belongs to IMF (IFS) and refers to current transfers, credit (Excludes Exceptional Financing) 
minus current transfers, debit. The second sub-period covers 1998-2001. 4) For Mexico refers to personal remittances received. 
 
 
 
Exports            
Period AR BO BR CH CO EC MX PN PR UR 
1990-1995 6.70 16.64 7.77 22.72 13.78 17.02 14.38 7.11 10.06 12.93 
1996-2001 9.00 16.20 7.51 21.57 11.99 20.18  27.73 6.53 11.48 10.54 
2002-2007 22.65 27.72 12.94 32.53 14.03 22.52 25.13 6.30 19.99 18.76 
2008-2012 18.79 37.81 10.35 32.38 15.32 27.10 28.62 n.a. 23.55 17.80 
Exports (top 10)          
Period AR BO BR CH CO EC MX PN PR UR 
1990-1995 3.33 12.52 2.82 13.22 7.12 15.22 6.26 4.31 6.30 6.51 
1996-2001 4.30 11.04 2.57 12.73 6.94 16.82  11.46 4.66 7.24 5.53 
2002-2007 11.53 22.17 4.47 20.98 8.68 19.22 12.18 4.64 13.38 10.29 
2008-2011 9.69 30.67 4.67 22.83 10.79 22.70 14.33 2.92 16.04 9.95 
Aid           
Period AR BO BR CH CO EC MX PN PR UR 
1990-1995 0.10 10.36 0.02 0.30 0.23 1.14 0.10 1.31 1.24 0.51 
1996-2001 0.03 8.22 0.03 0.13   0.25 0.74   0.02 0.28 0.76 0.11 
2002-2007 0.06 7.84 0.03 0.07 0.52 0.52 0.02 0.03 0.62 0.14 
2008-2011 0.03 3.61 0.03 0.07 0.37 0.28 0.04 0.31 0.22 0.11 
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Table 1 also shows the share of net FDI in GDP. There have been important net FDI 
for Bolivia in particular for the 1996-2001 period when it reached 9.4 percent of GDP (similarly 
for Brazil, for the same period, net FDI reached 3.5 percent of GDP). Chile and Peru have been 
recipients of important net FDI throughout the 1996-2012 period (the former reaching its 
highest share in 1996-2001 with 4.2 percent). Uruguay has also attracted considerable net FDIs 
since 2002 (reaching 4.1 percent in 2002-2007 and 5.8 percent in 2008-2012).  
As expected, aid is a less widespread important net inflow, and its importance has 
decreased over time, as the region has developed.  This type of inflow has been very important 
for Bolivia with a peak of 10.3 percent of GDP in the early 1990s (1990-1995) and 8.2 percent 
in 1996-2001, with lower shares in the rest of the period. Aid used to be important for Ecuador 
(1.1 percent), Panama (1.3), and Peru (1.2) in the 1990-1995 period.  
Net remittances are important inflows for some LAC, and with growing importance 
from the early 1990s to the 2000s, but less so in the late 2000s due to the economic crises in 
developed countries. This has been the case for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Paraguay, and Peru. For instance, for Paraguay the peak was reached in the period 1996-2001, 
with remittances representing 3.2 percent of GDP. For Mexico, the share of remittances in GDP 
increased from 1.1 percent in 1990-1995 to 2.5 percent in 2002-2007. For Ecuador, the peak 
periods have been 1996-2001 and 2002-2007 with 4.3 and 5.6 percent of GDP, respectively.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
2 Table 2 summarizes the rates of growth for all these types of net inflows, complementing the data on GDP share. 
From Tables 1 and 2 it can be seen that we include aid and remittances for the sake of completeness given that 
these net inflows have been important for some of the countries in some of the periods under study. Aid is 
important for Bolivia, and used to be important for other LAC in the early 1990s. Remittances are important for 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. 
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Table 2 - Net Inflows in LAC, 1990-2011 (Average rate of growth (%), per 6-year period) 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from UN (COMTRADE). 
Notes: 1) n.a. = not available. 2) For Panama (2002-2005). 3) Notice that the last period includes the 2008 world economic crisis that greatly 
affected exports around the world. 
 
Exports (top 10)          
Period AR BO BR CH CO EC MX PN PR UR 
1990-1995 8.87   4.02 5.78 14.32 5.87 8.32 17.46 14.66 9.87 4.16 
1996-2001 7.64 2.77 4.60 2.17 2.12 0.94 15.27 5.75 5.37 -0.38 
2002-2007 14.33 27.58 19.42 30.24 17.12 21.66 10.86 6.20 28.42 14.97 
2008-2011 13.69 22.81 25.77 7.73 27.07 15.84 8.78 -20.55 15.01 18.38 
Source: Own calculations using data from CEPAL (CEPALSTAT). 
Notes: 1) For Panama (2008-2009). For Uruguay (2008-2010). 2) Notice that the last period includes the 2008 world economic crisis that 
impacted negatively commodity trade around the world. 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from CEPAL (CEPALSTAT). 
Note: 1) For Uruguay (1993-1995). 
 
Aid           
Period AR BO BR CH CO EC MX PN PR UR 
1990-1995 1.29 7.16 -79.28 9.67 36.93 8.70 23.07 -5.88 5.91 10.40 
1996-2001 14.99 3.40 5.14  -6.18 24.91 -0.45 -108.1 1.79 4.51  -19.98 
2002-2007 -2.42 -2.91 25.87 -206.9 19.23 5.53 8.46 -84.33 -4.97 26.11 
2008-2011 -2.35 12.12 33.34 27.11 10.56 -5.82 78.50 22.54 -111.5 -8.50 
Source: Own calculations using data from WB (WDI). 
 
Net Remittances 
Period AR BO BR CH CO EC MX PN PR UR 
1990-1995 14.802 0.742 50.45 13.692 21.67 59.65 7.40 1.00 148.43 - 
1996-2001 -4.892 2,903 -13.92 0.772 20.91 24.74 15.48 -146.3  1.69 -10.00 
2002-2007 15.49 52.88 22.02 -2.692 16.03 15.28 18.57 1.61 23.46 22.43 
2008-2011 91.02 2 -1.02 -7.76 -22.862 -1.58 -5.95 -2.87 2,6612 6.81 0.52 
Source: Own calculations using data from WB (WDI) and IMF (IFS). 
Notes: 1) Net Remittances refers to personal remittances received minus personal remittances paid, unless otherwise noted. 2) For these 
periods and countries, net remittances paid (that is, those are actually outflows of remittances). 3) For Chile personal remittances received 
were zero from 1991 to 1999.  4) For Mexico refers to personal remittances received. 5) For Uruguay personal remittances, paid was zero in 
2002. From 1998 to 2001 data belongs to IMF (IFS) and refers to current transfers, credit (Excludes Exceptional Financing) minus current 
transfers, debit. 6) For Argentina (2003-2007, 2010-2011). For Bolivia (1997-2001). For Panama (2009-2011). For Uruguay (1998-2001). 
 
 
Exports            
Period AR BO BR CH CO EC MX PN PR UR 
1990-1995 11.89 6.46 8.27 14.34 8.99 10.35 26.81 11.57 11.35 4.68 
1996-2001 4.46 2.63 4.10 3.15 3.44 1.70  12.56 6.98  4.46 0.36 
2002-2007 13.41 24.55 18.72 25.39 16.54 20.23 9.58 3.22 27.09 14.74 
2008-2012 9.41 22.38 10.80 4.30 16.57 14.14 7.83 n.a. 11.77 15.02 
Net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Period AR BO BR CH CO EC MX PN PR UR 
1990-1995 22.61 83.56 431.1 41.16 17.51 40.91 43.08 24.58 31.73 26.79 
1996-2001  39.21 13.36 56.45 43.48 57.35 -409.2 19.23 35.31 -5.98 13.56 
2002-2007 52.69 -125.9 -101.0 24.80 53.21 -10.29 2.11 136.2 39.71 48.05 
2008-2012 19.72 14.16 23.88 -8.42 583.61 122.6 -39.02 15.65 13.59 22.44 
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Moreover, as Figure 3 suggests, LAC’s inflows in all of those categories has been (well) 
above the world average. These episodes have likely prompted concerns about the short- and 
medium-run impacts of those inflows on resource allocation and growth, in particular, about 
the negative impacts of such inflows on manufacturing development in the region.  
 
Figure 3 – Inflows in LAC versus the world 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
The literature has recognized this problem as the “Dutch disease” (hereafter DD)– the 
apparent relationship between the increase in exploitation of natural resources and a decline in 
the manufacturing sector, mainly affecting the latter’s decline through real exchange rate 
(RER) appreciation. Subsequent contributions (see, e.g. Corden and Neary, 1982; Ebrahim-
zadeh, 2003; Rajan and Subramanian, 2011) relate the Dutch disease to any development that 
results in a large inflow of foreign currency, including a sharp surge in natural resource 
prices, foreign assistance, remittances, and foreign direct investment. Figure 4 (left) is drafted 
to capture this phenomenon: over time (1991-2011), the significance of inflows in LAC 
increased (sliding from left to right on the scatter), which was likely associated with “crowding 
out” of the manufacturing sector. That the real exchange rate appreciation may have a role to 
play for the ‘Dutch disease’ can be observed on Figure 4 (right), whereby for selected LAC 
countries an appreciating trend is apparent throughout the entire observed period, but in 
particular in late 1990s and late 2000s. 
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Figure 4 – Relation between inflows and manufacturing value added and REER in LAC 
 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
Note: In the left figure, each dot represents specific year spanning 1991-2011 for the average inflows-to-GDP/manufacturing value added-to-GDP 
for all LAC countries. In right hand figure, an increase in the REER (real effective exchange rate) means appreciation. 
 
What might explain these patterns? Assuming that services are less tradable than 
manufacturing (which is in the substance of a standard Balassa-Samuelson analysis), Figure 4 
(left), in fact, suggests that capital inflows and the relative size of tradable sector in an economy 
are negatively correlated, while Figure 4 (right) that the channel through which this happens 
may be the real exchange rate overvaluation. However, these are simple correlations and do 
not necessarily imply causations. 
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to provide more persuasive empirical evidence 
on the effects of different episodes of large net inflows – export boom, remittances, FDIs, or 
aid on exportable manufacturing output – in Latin America countries. In addition, the paper 
focuses on explaining if the channel through which this correlation works is the overvaluation 
of the recipient country’s real exchange rate taking into account the role of both policies and 
China in the last decades. 
The paper brings a few novelties compared to the existing literature. First, to our 
knowledge, the paper is a first empirical effort to investigate the different types of net capital 
inflows – export, FDIs, aid and remittances – in the context of Dutch disease. Second, the paper 
identifies the role of policies in the 1990s and 2000s in LACs that ameliorate the DD effects of 
those net inflows. Finally, the paper puts DD and net inflows relation in the context of the 
recent crisis and the growing role of China in world trade markets, hence offering evidence if 
and how their relationships have been affected by both the crisis and the rise of China. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide some further insights into 
the theoretical background and a brief literature review. Section 3 outlines our empirical 
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strategy. In section 4, we present the baseline results. Section 5 presents results on the potential 
transmission mechanism of the Dutch disease, policy responses, the relation in times of crisis, 
and the role of China. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical foundations and brief literature survey  
Several authors during the late 1970s and early 1980s presented the first theoretical frameworks 
to explain key developments in an economy undergoing oil, gas or mineral export booms.3  
These theories may also apply to other commodities export booms, and other sources of net 
transfers such as FDIs, remittances, or aid. One of those key developments is the ensuing fall 
in output and employment in non-oil tradable sectors, namely, manufacturing sectors –which 
has been termed the “Dutch disease”4, the “tradables squeeze” (Corden 1981), or “de-
industrialisation” (Corden and Neary 1982).5 
In a nutshell, considering a small open economy (for simplicity, so world prices are 
taken as given), as a result of an export boom6, in the booming sector there is an increase in the 
marginal product of the mobile factor employed which draws resources out of other sectors –
the resource movement effect. The higher real income coming from the boom results in extra 
spending and to the extent that this extra spending falls also in nontradables there is an increase 
in their prices (real exchange rate appreciation) which in turn leads to further adjustments–the 
spending effect (Corden and Neary, 1982). Depending on the assumptions about factor 
mobility, Corden and Neary (1982) show that both effects, or one of them, may lead to a fall 
in the tradable (exportable) sector output (assumed all manufacturing) or, a process of de-
industrialization. However, under a Heckscher-Ohlin setting (with intersectoral mobility of 
more than one factor) these authors also show that de-industrialization may not be inevitable. 
The analysis of Corden and Neary makes other simplifying assumptions such as no 
monetary considerations, no government spending, full employment, etc. However, other 
studies do take into account those and other developments (monetary policy, fiscal policies, 
unemployment, immigration, international capital mobility, terms of trade effects, static and 
dynamic effects, etc.) and present frameworks that also lead to the basic outcome of the DD, 
namely, a reduction in tradable sectors (manufacturing) and increase in nontradables (services, 
                                                             
3 For a list of these early references see Corden (1984). 
4 According to Corden (1984), the first printed reference to the term “Dutch disease” can be found in The 
Economist, November 26th 1977, pp. 82-3). 
5 For some countries the squeezed “tradables” may include agriculture. 
6 The framework could be applied to other sources of net foreign inflows. 
10 
 
construction, etc.) in periods of export booms or other international transfer booms (see for 
instance, Neary 1982, Corden 1984, Cuddington 1989, just to name a few early references). 
Concerns about the potentially negative effects of large net foreign exchange inflows 
on output, prices, wages and growth may be granted. However, to the extent that adjustment in 
the non-booming tradable and the non-tradable sectors respond to changes in relative prices in 
the absence of distortions, those great amounts of net inflows need not be considered a disease 
(Corden and Neary 1982, Van Wijnberger 1984a, Harberger 1987). That is, the long-run 
outcome of a smaller manufacturing sector and larger nontradable sector (than without inflows) 
may be an equilibrium outcome. 
But, to the extent that manufacturing sector represents a key government objective–for 
various reasons such as growth, employment generation, reduced volatility, learning-by-doing 
and the like (Mesquita Moreira 2007, Van Wijnberger 1984b, Krugman 1987), we need to 
study output adjustments in manufacturing during those inflow episodes. 
The empirical evidence on Dutch disease has focused on real exchange rate 
developments. RER is considered a key channel of transmission of short- and medium-run 
impacts of inflows on output, employment and wages in the non-booming tradable and non-
tradable sectors. Many theoretical and empirical studies document the effects of inflows on the 
RER (see for instance, Edwards and Ahamed 1986, Harberger 1987, Saborowski 2009, Magud 
and Sosa 2010 and reference therein cited). Most of them use country level data. We shall focus 
on developments around the RER to the extent that these developments help explain impacts 
on manufacturing industry output growth.   
While the lackluster growth performance of manufacture in LAC and the concomitant 
fall in the share of manufacturing value added in GDP has been attributed to endowment and 
geography, some authors supported the “natural resource curse” and (few) others rejected it. 
Mesquita Moreira (2007) provides not only a nice summary of these conflicting views but also 
compelling arguments as to why we must look beyond endowment and geography, and even 
pass beyond convergence and trade liberalization arguments to explain the lackluster 
manufacturing performance in LACs. This author emphasizes the role of policies (and 
government) in industrialization, and discusses the key disadvantages faced by LACs’ 
manufacturing: lack of access to sufficient financing, lack of incentives to invest in human 
capital and technology, and “most importantly” that LACs have to face formidable competitors, 
particularly those from East Asia (such as China). 
That is, in addition to net inflows booms and RER channel, there has been concerns in 
the literature that the growth of Chinese exports to the rest of the world may lead to de-
11 
 
industrialization in LAC (Blazquez-Lidoy et al. 2006, Lall and Weiss 2005, and Mesquita 
Moreira 2007), reinforcing thus the potential DD effects of the export boom in some LAC 
countries –export boom in turn originated in the great Chinese demand for commodities. 7  
Therefore, this study contributes to the literature providing evidence on the effects of 
competition from Chinese imports in third parties (as opposed to Chinese imports from LAC) 
on LAC manufacturing industries, trying to separate out any negative impact on exportable 
manufacturing from the effects of net inflows booms (the DD) in LAC. The focus on LAC 
exportable manufacturing is granted since China competes with LAC in the world markets 
mainly in manufacturing. The main idea is to account for the loss of market share by a LAC 
country to China in manufacturing products. 
But the evidence on the impact of inflows on manufacturing sector developments in 
developing countries is not abundant, in particular if it uses industry- or firm-level data. Among 
the few studies that present empirical evidence on the decline in manufacturing output due to 
transfer inflows are Rajan and Subramanian (2008, 2011). These authors focus on aid inflows. 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) use a cross country approach, while Rajan and Subramanian 
(2011) improve on this approach by using industry level data for several countries recipients 
of aid, thus avoiding the criticisms against country level studies, while dealing with problems 
that may plague industry level studies. Both document the shrinking effect of aid inflows on 
manufacturing output growth. Other studies have focused on the impacts of remittances’ 
inflows on manufacturing and service growth. Using a panel data approach with country-level 
data, Lartey et al. (2008) conclude that the share of manufacturing in total output declines while 
the share of services increases. Ismail (2010) use a sample of oil exporting countries and 
industry data to test several implications of booms in oil exports one of which is the negative 
impacts on manufacturing output, and find that an increase in oil prices considered permanent 
do indeed have a negative impact on manufacturing output. Vaz and Baer (2014) investigate if 
over/undervaluation of LAC’s currencies has a role to play for manufacturing growth and 
confirm this role is stronger in LAC than in the advanced economies, the openness and the 
sectoral import component likely being important elements in explaining this relationship. By 
using industry-level data our study contributes to this small, but growing number of studies 
                                                             
7 Given that we study DD symptoms (i.e. negative impacts, or deindustrialization, on non-booming export-
oriented manufacture) we focus on impacts on export-oriented manufacturing rather than on manufacture industry 
in general. According to the literature, the evidence on export growth of China is that trade between China and 
LAC (bilateral, not third party) is based on the exchange of manufactures and primary commodities between 
China and LAC respectively. Chinese manufacturing imports may have an impact on import competing 
manufactures in LAC that are beyond the scope of the present study. Moreover, the estimations shall focus on 
third-party trade, not bilateral trade between China and LAC. 
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that effectively seeks to explain manufacturing output developments and their transmission 
channels in LACs. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1 Economic model 
We use industry-level data to investigate if industries that typically export more grow slower 
than industries that typically export less in Latin American countries experiencing large net 
foreign inflows while accounting for other key economic developments and policies. By using 
industry-level data, the bias from omitted variables or model specification that plagues cross-
country studies is hence diminished. In addition, by focusing on manufacturing industries only, 
the study can rule out factors that would keep manufacturing underdeveloped as those factors 
should not affect the differences between manufacturing industries (Rajan and Subramanian 
2011, p. 100). The summary analysis of different types of episodes should elicit a classification 
of episodes and in doing so draw lessons for management of future episodes of Dutch disease.  
The econometric approach is based on manufacturing industry-level data using the 
following regression form: 
 
𝑣𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (1) 
 
The dependent variable (vagijt) is the annual average real rate of growth of value added in 
industry i in country j in time t. ismij is the industry i’s share of manufacturing in country j in 
the initial period (hence no subscript t); 𝛽1 is to control for convergence effects; infexpijt stands 
for the interaction between the inflow boom to country j and the exportability in industry i in 
period t. αi are the industry fixed effects; αj are the country fixed effects; αt are the time fixed 
effects. 𝜀𝑖𝑗  is the error term which is assumed to be well-behaved. 
As stated above, the dependent variable is the growth rate of value added of the 
manufacturing industries, in US dollars and is taken from UNIDO. According to the World 
Bank, manufacturing refers to industries in ISIC divisions 15-37. UNIDO follows this 
classification. Value added is output minus intermediate inputs. It does not include deductions 
for depreciation, nor does it include depletion and degradation of natural resources. The 
classification follows the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3.  
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Value added is at the 3-digit ISIC classification, from 151 to 372. We transform value added 
to real data using the GDP deflator in US dollars.8 
The inflow boom variable (inf) is defined, on a country basis, as a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 if the observation in that particular year exceeds a linear country-specific 
trend, and zero otherwise. Inflow appears in four distinct forms: export, FDI, aid and 
remittances. While paralleling linear trend may seem naïve, it may actually reveal a capital 
boom other than the capital inflow developments determined by the long-run economic setting 
or fundamentals (as determined by the long-run path of the economy). By doing so, we 
disentangle the boom periods from the normal and bust periods. We believe this distinction is 
the main advantage of defining boom periods in this way as compared to taking logs or growth 
rates of the respective variables. Table A8-A11 in Appendix 5 suggest that this method 
reasonably well identifies those periods in LAC: the export booms are mainly concentrated 
during the mid-1990s and the pre-crisis 2000s; FDI booms are rather scattered; aid booms are 
pronounced in the early 1990s; while remittance booms over pre-crisis 2000s.  
 The exportability covariate (exp) tries to capture the export orientation of the industries 
under study. Under Dutch disease, industries with export orientation should be hurt, the more 
export oriented they are the more their value added should receive a negative impact in times 
of net inflows booms. We proxy exportability with a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the 
industry has the ratio of exports to value added (averaged across all countries in the sample) 
greater than the median across industries and zero otherwise. This dummy is in turn interacted 
with the net inflow boom variable of the country in the sample.9  
Rajan and Subramanian (2011) propose another measure of exportability which is a 
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the industry is textile, clothing, leather, and footwear –which 
are industries associated with the growth of developing countries as they move out of 
agriculture. 
β2, the coefficient of the interaction between the inflow term and the exportability of 
industry i, then captures the effect (Dutch disease) under study: β2 should be significant and 
negative to assert the hypothesis that countries that receive more inflows see a more negative 
impact in industrial sectors that are more sensitive to inflows. Obtaining separate β2 coefficients 
                                                             
8 A better alternative for deflator is the PPI (producer price index, total or better yet, for manufacture) but not 
all countries have the series and even if they do, the indices are not complete for the period under study. 
9 To calculate the ratio of exports to value added we need data on exports at the ISIC level, revision 3, because 
value added follows this classification. Export data, on the other hand, follows harmonized system (HS). We 
perform a series of homologations and construct the ratios, and based on the ratios construct the dummy. This 
dummy is in turn interacted with the net capital inflow variables of the country sample under study. 
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for the different forms of inflows will help in disentangling if and to what extent they differently 
affect the decline in manufacturing. 
The baseline model (1) is then upgraded to investigate if the effect of capital inflows 
onto sectoral growth is channeled through currency overvaluation or to provide alternative 
explanations; to investigate the relationships during the recent crisis; and to investigate China’s 
role for LAC. 
 
3.2 Estimation method  
To estimate (1), we start by utilizing the panel fixed effects estimator. However, this may be a 
naïve approach imperiled to identification problems: the relationship between manufacturing 
growth and overvaluation may be endogenous, due to both unobserved factors and/or 
simultaneity (Baltagi, 2008). The relationship between overvaluation and manufacturing 
growth could be, in fact, a product of the work of a third unobservable factor. For example, 
consider a country with a reputation of a strong manufacturing base: it is more likely that it has 
strong currency also. Other factors, like the level of financial intermediation, the work of 
monetary or fiscal policy, could be factors affecting both manufacturing growth and exchange 
rate simultaneously. It could also be that industry growth causes some appreciation pressures 
over those determined by the overall GDP, i.e. over the Balassa-Samuelson effect, especially 
if industry had a higher growth than the overall economy, in which case an uncontrolled reverse 
causation would render results biased. Hence, we will make use of the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) whereby lags of the suspected for endogeneity variables are used to correct 
for it, as a fairly standard way in the literature to identify the causal relationship overvaluation 
– manufacturing growth.10 
 
3.3 Data 
Annual data are used over the period that runs from the early 1990s to the late 2000s to estimate 
the model set in section 3.1. However, note that the panel is unbalanced, i.e. the value added 
variable (the dependent variable) is not available for some industries in some countries, for 
some years. The variables we use in this analysis are collected from the following sources: 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) database INDSTAT4 2013 
                                                             
10 Note that we do not opt to use a dynamic model due to the nature of the dependent variable: it is the growth rate 
of the value added, which by definition cannot be a persistent variable. As such, it is not suitable for a dynamic 
model. 
15 
 
which contains value added at the 3-digit level ISIC, rev.  3; ECLAStat database; World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank; COMTRADE; and, IFS database of the 
International Monetary Fund. A basic summary statistics of all variables used throughout this 
analysis is given in Table A12 in Appendix 6.  
The countries included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay11. Table A13 in Appendix 6 describes the panel used in 
detail. The restriction that determines the periods for each country is the availability of value 
added data. On average we have 12 years of data for each country. The data starts in early-mid 
1990s (except for Colombia and Panama), and goes until early 2000s for four countries 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Panama) and late 2000s (2008 or 2010) for the rest of countries (Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay). Table A14 describes the panel used, 
with number of ISIC sectors for each country. In Table A14, the number of times an ISIC sector 
or industry appears represents the number of years in which the sector appears in the database. 
For instance, for Brazil most industries (on average 58, out of 61 possible) appear throughout 
the 15 years of the data available for this country (1996-2010). 
 
4. Results  
We present the baseline results in Table 3. The dependent variable is the annual growth in value 
added in industry i in country j. We estimate the coefficient of the interaction between the 
particular type of capital inflow and exportability. Each pair of columns presents the results per 
inflow type, for exportability index 1 and 2, respectively. In general, majority of the results 
suggest that value added in exportable industries grows relatively more slowly than for other 
industries in the countries that receive more capital inflows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
11 Paraguay has only two years of manufacturing industry value added data. Given that our concern in on growth 
we do not use Paraguay data in our sample. 
16 
 
 Table 3. Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: Core specification 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share -0.926 -0.951 -0.934 -0.935 -0.870 -0.921 -0.913 -0.935 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -24.42***   -4.186   -21.98***   -10.99***   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -6.742*  2.966  -16.31***  3.672 
                  
Constant -6.4510 -4.2100 -4.5690 -3.9500 -10.4600 -6.1770 -0.9360 -4.3630 
                  
Observations 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 
R-squared 0.036 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the OLS procedure. Standard errors are robust. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 
percent, respectively. All equations include country and industry fixed effects. Initial industry share (ij) refers to the share of 
industry i in country j as a share of total manufacturing sector value added in country j at the beginning of the sample period. 
Inflow boom1 (j) refers to the value of total export / foreign direct investment / aid / remittances received in country j exceeding 
the linear trend. Exportability1 index is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the industry has the ratio of exports to value added 
(averaged across all countries in the sample) greater than the median across industries, and zero otherwise. Exportability2 index 
is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for ISIC sectors 171-192, and 0 otherwise. 
 
In particular, results suggest that export, aid and remittances’ booms cause the Dutch 
disease in LAC, but not FDIs. In addition, the remittances boom effect is found only under 
exportability index 1. Coefficients suggest that in an inflow boom period (i.e. the period when 
the observation has been above the trend), exportable industries grew slower by between 6.7 
and 24.4 percentage points per year than compared to non-exportable industries.  
 
 
5. Further analysis and discussion 
5.1 Transmission mechanism 
We would like to go beyond the finding that booms of export, aid and remittances in LAC 
caused a ‘Dutch disease’, i.e. negatively affected the sectoral growth, the effect being the 
largest when export was booming, while FDIs were found not to have played any role. A more 
important question is the underlying mechanism of this finding, i.e. the transmission channel. 
It could be that these excess inflows caused currency appreciation, hence hurting sectoral 
growth.  
To isolate the potential Balassa-Samuelson channel (i.e. that appreciation is due to 
rising economy), we calculate an excess appreciation, i.e. the one over the Balassa-Samuelson-
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type of currency appreciation. We define excess appreciation following Johnson, Ostry and 
Subramanian (2007) who estimate overvaluation as the difference between a predicted RER 
(estimated from a Balassa-Samuelson-like regression) and the actual RER. The predicted RER, 
which according to Johnson et al. constitutes a sort of equilibrium real exchange rate, is 
estimated running a regression of the log of the ratio of country’s price level to that of the US 
on the log of country’s real per capita GDP in PPP terms (the Balassa-Samuelson effect in 
cross-section, as indicated in Johnson et al.: the richer the country the more appreciated should 
the RER be). The actual RER should be alternatively: (1) the ratio of a country’s CPI for that 
of the US in a sample of all LAC and OECD countries, or (2) a trade-weighted bilateral real 
exchange rate where bilateral partners are the five main trade partners of each country, and the 
price ratio is still the ratio of a country’s CPI to that of the US using the sample of 11 LAC 
countries (See Annex 2 for more details on the excess appreciation estimation). If the real-
exchange-rate-excess-appreciation channel is in operation, then the estimated coefficient 
should be significant and negative, suggesting that excess appreciation, caused by inflow 
booms, reduces the annual average growth of the exportable sectors. 
Table 4, contrary to these expectations, provides initial signs that the excess 
appreciation may not be the channel through which capital inflows affected sectoral growth. 
The table provides simple correlations between excess appreciation and capital inflow booms: 
while the correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level, they are of a very small 
magnitude and have an unexpected negative sign. On the other hand, we would expect that in 
countries with more capital inflows, currency will be appreciated more.  
 
Table 4. Correlation between capital booms and excess appreciation 
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
Excess appreciation  -0.0266* -0.0456** -0.0683*** -0.1183*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
To further pursue this point, we estimate model (1) with an additional term: the product 
of the excess appreciation and the exportability index. The results of interest are presented in 
the middle of the Table 5 and show that the interaction term is positive and insignificant. This 
suggests that the exchange rate overvaluation does not exert influence on the growth of the 
value added of the exportable industries in LAC. That this is the case, it could be observed 
through the direct effect of inflow booms in the exportable industries on value added: in Table 
5 they are quite similar as in Table 3. On the other hand, had the excess appreciation been the 
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channel, we would have observed a reduction in the importance of the direct effect, as is the 
case in Rajan and Subramanian (2011).  
 
 Table 5. Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: The role of excess appreciation 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share -0.94 -0.946 -0.955 -0.93 -0.883 -0.917 -0.926 -0.93 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -24.21***   -3.947   -21.77***   -10.60***   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -6.664*  3.14  -16.25***  3.95 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
5.664  8.501  4.805  4.897  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  3.938   4.598   3.449   4.889 
          
Constant -31.64*** -37.54*** -37.45*** -37.73*** -29.95*** -37.88*** -32.19*** -38.18*** 
                 
Observations 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 
R-squared 0.036 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.036 0.032 0.033 0.032 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the OLS procedure. Standard errors are robust. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, 
respectively. All equations include country and industry fixed effects. Initial industry share (ij) refers to the share of industry i in country j 
as a share of total manufacturing sector value added in country j at the beginning of the sample period. Inflow boom1 (j) refers to the value 
of total export / foreign direct investment / aid / remittances received in country j exceeding the linear trend. Exportability1 index is a 
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the industry has the ratio of exports to value added (averaged across all countries in the sample) greater 
than the median across industries, and zero otherwise. Exportability2 index is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for ISIC sectors 171-192, 
and 0 otherwise. The measure of excess appreciation is based on departures from long-run PPP. For every year in the sample period, we 
regress over the cross-section of countries, the ratio of country’s price level and US price level on its real GDP per capita (in PPP terms). 
The difference between the actual price ratio and the estimated price ratio is a measure of the country’s excess appreciation . 
 
The positive coefficients on the excess appreciation interaction term we observe in 
some cases in Table 5 may be puzzling, although insignificant. We may think in a couple of 
veins of how to justify these. First, the excess appreciation interaction term may be still 
capturing some remaining Balassa-Samuelson effects, i.e. that industry growth causes some 
appreciation pressures over those determined by the overall GDP, especially if industry had a 
higher growth than the overall economy. Indeed, in our sample, the average growth of the value 
added in LAC industries has been about 16% per year, while that of GDP per capita about four 
times lower, i.e. about 4%. This may lend some support to our claim. Second, and stemming 
from the first, the coefficient in front of the excess appreciation interaction may be suffering 
reverse causality, which is presently not captured. As the coefficient is positive, it may be 
actually reflecting the fact that the higher export and establishment of new factories through 
foreign investment appreciated the currency, but its potential negative effect for the industrial 
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production was likely outweighed with the increased export production or with the production 
of the new factories; or that aid and remittances appreciate currency, but people having more 
money consume more, or establish small business out of these private transfers, hence 
manufacturing industry grows.  Third, the coefficients may also reflect a cross-sectional 
dependence as the group of countries we are dealing with likely exhibit similar economic 
influences (for instance, on the RER see Fig. 3, right side). Finally, a positive and insignificant 
coefficient may be a reflection of policies pursued by policymakers to curb appreciation 
pressures and prevent them from adversely affecting the economy. If this was the case (i.e. 
policies subdues appreciation pressures and prevented potential manufacturing decline), then 
inflow booms likely affect the manufacturing growth through other channel.  
To pursue the first and the second concern, Table 6 presents the results whereby the 
excess appreciation interaction term is suspected endogenous and instrumented with its own 
lags. The Hansen, under-identification and weak identification tests – given toward the bottom 
of the table - provide support that instruments are valid: the p-value of the under-identification 
test consistently suggests that the null of underidentified equation is rejected; the Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic of the weak identification test reports very high values, i.e. much higher than 
the Stock and Yogo (2002, 2005) values of the lowest percentage of the maximal IV size; the 
p-value of the Hansen J test also consistently suggests that the null of valid instruments is not 
rejected (the p-value is above 0.1 and does not approach 1, see further discussion on this in 
Petreski, 2010). The other coefficients remain robust to this change. The coefficients of interest 
(the excess appreciation interaction terms) remain insignificant, although now change sign 
under the exportability index 1. However, the main conclusion is that after any reverse causality 
has been accounted for in the model, the excess appreciation is confirmed not to be the channel 
through which capital booms affected manufacturing value added decline in LAC. 
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 Table 6. Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: The role of excess appreciation - instrumented 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share -1.686* -1.699* -1.644* -1.683* -1.598* -1.666* -1.626* -1.681* 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -22.50***   -0.353   -13.27***   -6.814*   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -10.28**  6.872  -11.97***  6.394 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
-32.41  -38.9  -40.54  -42.41  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  4.172   1.602   2.954   2.668 
         
Constant 10.44 10.92 16.91** 11.79 11.92 11.55 11.92 11.65 
                 
Underidentification test 
Chi-sq(2) P-val 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
909 9,387 922 10,072 910 9,401 888 9,303 
Hansen test 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
0.590 0.098 0.593 0.177 0.634 0.104 0.579 0.271 
                 
Observations 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 
R-squared 0.059 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.053 0.051 0.051 0.051 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the GMM procedure. Lags of the instrumented variable are used as instruments. Standard errors are 
robust. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
 
 
We address the third concern – the one of the potential cross-sectional dependence – 
firstly by testing for its presence. This may imply a specification problem stemming from an 
unaccounted problem of cross-section dependence. As stated in Baltagi and Pesaran (2007), 
p.229, “Cross section dependence can arise due to spatial or spillover effects, or could be due 
to unobserved (or unobservable) common factors.” We test for the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence in our measure of overvaluation of RERs, as suggested by De Hoyos and Sarafadis 
(2006), by applying the Pesaran (2004) CD test for cross-section dependence in panel time-
series data. The p-value=0.001 suggests that the null of cross-section independence CD ~ 
N(0,1) is rejected. Hence, in Table 7 we report the Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors to 
cross-sectional dependence (Hoechle, 2007). Note that due to technical limitation, we control 
for the fixed effects (industry in each country), but not for the industry and country effects 
separately. This drives the initial share coefficient larger than previously. However, the other 
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results remain largely robust and comparable to that of Table 5, suggesting that despite present, 
the cross-sectional dependence does not impose problems in our specifications. 
 
 Table 7. Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: Errors robust to cross-sectional dependence 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share -11.40** -21.61*** -20.18*** -22.47*** -14.21*** -21.61*** -16.56*** -22.74*** 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -32.90***   -3.378   -22.33***   -11.76*   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -12.06**  2.876  -17.26***  3.294 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
14.96  19.63  14.86  14.87  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  3.674   5.058   2.322   5.515 
         
Observations 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the OLS procedure. Standard errors are based on the Driscoll-Kraay estimator, robust to cross-sectional 
dependence. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
 
To pursue our fourth concern from above – that economic policies may have worked to 
counteract the potential appreciation due to capital inflows – we add to the basic specification 
six policy variables: (1) the log of the broad money, (2) the reference interest rate, (3) the log 
of the foreign exchange reserves; (4) the exchange-rate regime (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) – 
all four to capture the work of the monetary policy; (5) the government budget balance to GDP 
– to capture the work of the fiscal policy; and (6) the terms of trade – to capture the work of 
the foreign-trade policy. IMF (2011) reviews responses of countries to a surge of capital flows 
and, inter alia (p.7), suggests that so as to combat currency appreciation countries may purchase 
the excess foreign currency on the foreign exchange market and/or ease monetary policy to 
weaken the currency. In addition, we let the fiscal and foreign-trade policy to potentially play 
a role for easing the appreciation pressures. It could be that LAC countries were suffocating 
excess appreciation by managing capital flows, in which case the capital flows were not causing 
Dutch disease through this channel. An alternative reasoning is that our measure of excess 
appreciation is not capturing RER developments. This could be the case if the national price 
index (CPI) change used did not coincide exactly with exchange rate appreciation due to terms 
of trade effects (Corden 1981). The addition of the terms of trade should capture this effect as 
well.  
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Table 8 presents the results (Tables A2-A7 in Appendix 3 present the results variable 
by variable, for the sake of robustness testing). Results are appealing. They suggest that any 
appreciation pressures due to increased inflows from export have been suffocated by the central 
bank, as well by fiscal policy easing. While the excess appreciation variable becomes negative, 
it becomes significant only under the exportability index 1. It suggests that excess appreciation 
of the currency (over that determined by the Balassa-Samuelson effects) of one percentage 
point, on average results in a lower manufacturing growth by one percentage point. Policies 
themselves are found with the expected signs and part of them are significant.  
The largest role to play is apparently for the monetary policy: eased monetary stance 
(more money in the economy and more reserves accumulated) provided space for higher 
growth of manufacturing industry, as suggested by the IMF’s (2011) study.  
Similarly, the more flexible the exchange rate regime in operation, the more negative 
the impact of the excess appreciation on the manufacturing growth: pressures for appreciation 
likely converted into actual appreciation under more flexible arrangements of the exchange 
rate, as compared to the case of a peg when the intervention of the central bank to combat those 
pressures has been likely more aggressive.  
Interestingly, though, fiscal policy exerts positive role: any appreciation’s negative 
impact on manufacturing growth has been also compensated by the government reducing the 
crowding-out effect. Namely, more prudent fiscal policy (reducing deficits or accumulating 
surpluses) is found to positively affect manufacturing growth as a provider of space for the 
private sector.  
Hence, Table 8 gives the most important evidence that the exchange rate overvaluation 
is the channel through which capital inflows work to reduce manufacturing growth, but 
authorities design policies to combat these negative effects: they either supply more money on 
the market; or let excess domestic liquidity when there is excess foreign currency liquidity, or 
withdraw fiscal easing to let more space for the private sector; or do a combination of these. In 
addition, the pegs likely act as a strong buffer against appreciation, which may also be the 
reason of why some of these countries experienced episodes of high inflation rather than 
manufacturing decline. The finding that overvaluation is the channel in work for manufacturing 
decline in LAC is ultimately in line with the recent study of Vaz and Baer (2014). 
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 Table 8. Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: The role of policies 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share -1.714 -1.683 -1.681 -1.666 -1.66 -1.644 -1.669 -1.67 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -24.41***   -4.535   -16.74***   -7.171   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -12.14**  2.394  -9.811**  6.667 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
-83.53  -98.25*  -94.59*  -99.86*  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  -2.233   -9.36   -6.35   -8.469 
         
Log of money 51.54*** 24.73* 38.65** 23.30* 36.16* 23.05* 32.46* 24.29* 
Interest rate -0.319 0.154 -0.282 0.149 -0.309 0.151 -0.253 0.142 
Log of foreign reserves 12.45 26.73*** 15.54 26.29*** 12.33 26.33*** 15.58 26.05*** 
Exchange rate regime  -6.001** -4.735* -8.951*** -4.897* -7.224*** -4.752* -8.871*** -4.957* 
Terms of trade -0.01 -0.06 -0.22 -0.08 -0.21 -0.08 -0.339* -0.07 
Budget balance to GDP 3.270* 3.264* 4.338** 3.294* 4.415** 3.335* 4.643** 3.244* 
                  
Constant -1,648*** -1,295*** -1,356*** -1,244*** -1,212** -1,239*** -1,174** -1,267*** 
                  
Underidentification test 
Chi-sq(2) P-val 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
415.4 6,522.0 418.0 7,614.0 418.0 6,746.0 407.2 6,771.0 
Hansen test 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
0.925 0.244 0.945 0.457 0.945 0.352 0.883 0.661 
                 
Observations 3,434 3,434 3,434 3,434 3,434 3,434 3,434 3,434 
R-squared 0.064 0.058 0.055 0.058 0.059 0.058 0.055 0.058 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the GMM procedure. Lags of the instrumented variable are used as instruments. Standard errors are robust. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
 
Finally, for the sake of completeness of our initial argumentation, we investigate 
another channel through which capital inflows may have caused a DD. One alternative 
explanation is that export industries with a high need of capital grow relatively slower as the 
country receives more capital inflows. Rajan and Subramanian (2011) argue the opposite of 
this holds for aid: the government reduces its borrowing from the banking system in response 
to aid received (or remittances received relieving the pressure on the current account), and 
hence makes more credit available to the private sector. However, think about exports: if the 
economy receives more proceeds from exports, then facing increased need by exportable 
industries over the need satisfied with the export proceeds may actually harm their growth. In 
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such industries where growth should be fed by more capital, larger unsatisfied need may be 
associated with slower growth of the value added. Table 9 presents the results of adding the 
interaction between boom periods, the Rajan and Zingales’s (1998) measure of the dependence 
of a particular industry on external resources to finance investment and the exportability 
variable. Results suggest that in the period under study the capital channel is not the one 
explaining manufacturing decline in LAC. 
 
 Table 9. Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: The role of capital channel 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share -0.924 -0.954 -0.934 -0.935 -0.869 -0.921 -0.914 -0.935 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -24.48***   -4.217   -21.78***   -11.13***   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -9.172**  4.496  -16.04***  4.263 
                  
Inflow boom*External 
dependence*Exportability1 
0.0801  0.0235  -0.145  0.125  
Inflow boom* External 
dependence*Exportability2 
  0.154   -0.0963   -0.0171   -0.0373 
         
Constant -32.49*** -37.56*** -38.75*** -37.77*** -30.66*** -37.89*** -32.80*** -38.18*** 
         
Observations 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 
R-squared 0.036 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.036 0.032 0.033 0.032 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the OLS procedure. Standard errors are robust. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, 
respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
 
 
5.2 Crisis effects 
In this section, we account for the 2008 world economic crisis by adding a dummy taking the 
value of one for year 2008 and onwards and zero otherwise. We would like to measure if and 
to what extent has the crisis affected the relationship between manufacturing and inflows.12 
                                                             
12 This is a tentative and exploratory analysis subject to many caveats. For one, only 3 countries have data for 
2008-2010; and only 2 for 2008. In total 5, which is half the sample. While the crisis started unfolding in 2008, it 
may actually be that we should start in 2009, which reduces the crisis sample further. In addition, we may need a 
more formal test to see whether the crisis period should start in 2008 or 2009, but the lack of data prevent us to 
do so. Even if the start is resolved, the crisis further unfolded beyond 2010 and the effects on manufacturing could 
be seen actually with some lag, i.e. after 2010. On the other hand, it has been said in the literature  that the recovery 
was fast for LAC, and that by 2010 everything was back to normal. In the literature there is also a notion that the 
impact on LAC of the crisis was not as important as in other regions or as in other times it would have been. Thus, 
it may not matter to study the crisis developments anyway, in particular, not for growth. However, like we said, 
we introduce this section as an exploratory analysis, and leave it to the donors whether to include it or not. 
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This has not been investigated in the literature so far, but the intuition suggests a potentially 
positive and significant coefficient. Table 10 presents the results, which remain largely robust 
to this change. Note, that the coefficients in front of the boom-exportability interaction and the 
boom-exportability-crisis interaction should be observed in conjunction: given that countries 
experiencing inflow booms were found to see a more negative impact in industrial sectors that 
are more sensitive to export, then positive coefficient on the crisis interaction would mean that 
the negative effect of inflows on manufacturing is reduced.  
Results, however, suggest something else: the manufacturing decline under the inflow 
booms has been happening before the crisis and likely stopped during the crisis, as we obtain 
insignificant coefficients. Interestingly though, the insignificant coefficients for FDIs we 
documented for the overall case (Table 5) become significant during the crisis, also suggesting 
that under large FDI inflows, manufacturing growth has been lower for exportable industries. 
However, the practical meaning of this finding may be limited, as the incidence of the FDI 
booms has been before not during the crisis.13 
 
 Table 10. Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: The relationship in times of crisis 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share -0.929 -0.940 -0.927 -0.926 -0.864 -0.921 -0.902 -0.932 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -26.35***   0.572   -25.57***   -9.121**   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -5.431  6.262  -15.79***  4.587 
                  
Inflow 
boom*Exportability1*Crisis 
8.112  -29.45***  17.49*  -14.090  
Inflow 
boom*Exportability2*Crisis 
  -6.49   -15.62**   -2.241   -6.738 
         
Constant -6.379 -4.302 -4.954 -3.982 -10.770 -6.144 -1.947 -4.475 
         
Observations 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 
R-squared 0.036 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.036 0.032 0.033 0.032 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the OLS procedure. Standard errors are robust. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, 
respectively. Other notes as in Table 3. 
 
 
                                                             
13 During the crisis there was no excess appreciation –in fact several Latin American countries devalued (see 
Figure A1) which may have help reverse any RER overvaluation. 
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5.3 The role of China 
Finally, we investigate the role of China for the economies of LAC looking into two 
relevant issues: bilateral trade (LAC-China) and, fundamentally, third-party trade. 
Notwithstanding production concerns, most of the literature addressing the effects of China’s 
economic performance on Latin America has focused only on trade issues –both bilateral and 
in third markets–, rather than on the effects of competition on the domestic market production 
(Jenkins 2008a, see also Jenkins 2008b for a summary of previous studies on the impact of 
China exports to the rest of the world on LAC exports). In fact, trade (and other) inflows 
developments are related to production.14  
Over the last twenty years, but in particular in the 2000s, China’s trade has penetrated 
significantly not only in many countries across LAC, (and with it becoming the main trade 
partner for several LAC countries – displacing in some cases other fellow LAC countries), but 
also in main export markets of several LACs. One of the relevant issues is then how can the 
fact that China is exporting a lot (of manufactures) to some of the LAC countries affect the 
exports of other fellows LAC countries. At the same time, it is known that China imports 
mainly commodities from LAC. While some of the China’s influence has been already 
captured through the inclusion of the real exchange rate (the excess appreciation), we 
specifically account for the import penetration of China in the LAC export markets of LAC 
countries for which this issue is relevant. Table 11 adds the annual growth rate of the share of 
imported manufactures from China in the total imported manufactures to investigate if an influx 
of manufacturing import from China in LAC replaces the domestic manufacturing production, 
hence negatively affecting the manufacturing industry growth and working in the same 
direction as the Dutch disease. We calculate that over time, China’s export to LAC increased 
from about 4.7% in total LAC’s manufacturing import in the 1990s to 13.8% in the 2000s. For 
a decade, this has been a nearly threefold increase which might have affected domestic 
manufacturing production. Results suggest a marginal negative influence, as the coefficient is 
significant only at the 10%. But, the economic significance is infinitesimally small, suggesting 
that such a threefold hastening of China’s share in LAC’s manufacturing imports decelerates 
domestic manufacturing growth by negligible 0.015 percentage point, on average. The 
remaining coefficients remain robust to this treatment. 
 
                                                             
14 Granted, not just manufacturing production, but production in general. Our focus here is on (exportable) 
manufacturing production. 
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 Table 11. Impact of manufacturing imports from China 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share -1.684 -2.932** -1.602 -2.916** -1.546 -2.896** -1.558 -2.918** 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -25.00***   -0.869   -14.52***   -10.42**   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -11.45**  3.052  -16.11***  6.18 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
-41.58  -46.39  -49.410  -51.760  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  -40.5   -67.37   -71.63   -53.45 
         
Annual growth rate of the 
manufacturing imports from 
China / Total manufacturing 
imports 
-1.50E-05 -4.43e-05* -2.77E-05 -4.55e-05* -2.23E-05 -4.48e-05* -1.56E-05 -4.54e-05* 
         
Constant 12.75 11.10 14.44* 10.52 20.90** 11.65 15.62* 11.10 
         
Underidentification test 
Chi-sq(2) P-val 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
704.8 354.0 713.1 393.1 699.8 316.5 687.3 308.9 
Hansen test 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
0.602 0.831 0.599 0.977 0.639 0.747 0.574 0.846 
                 
Observations 3,529 2,772 3,529 2,772 3,529 2,772 3,529 2,772 
R-squared 0.059 0.058 0.049 0.058 0.052 0.059 0.050 0.058 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the GMM procedure. Lags of the instrumented variable are used as instruments. Standard errors are robust. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
 
The other relevant issue is that of China displacing LAC manufacturing in third-party 
countries, i.e., China taking the place of LAC as a key provider of countries that used to be, 
and may be still are, the key trade partners for LAC, such as the USA. As pointed by Jenkins 
(2008a), it is LAC’s exports of manufactures to third markets that face that strongest 
competition from China which in turn threatens manufacturing production in LAC.15 
                                                             
15 There are other economic effects tied to China’s formidable economic performance that may threaten 
manufacturing exports and production in LACs. Just to mention two key developments. First, the effects of FDI 
diversion from the region to China, which have been suggested to be negative for just a few countries in the region 
like Mexico and Colombia (García Herrero and Santabárbara 2005). Second, terms of trade effects, as increasing 
Chinese demand for commodities pushed prices of commodities exported by LAC up, but at the same time 
increasing Chinese manufacturing production and exports depresses prices of manufactures produced by LAC, –
depending on the net export/import position of a LAC country in such goods TOT of a LAC may be affected 
negatively or not. When speaking of domestic impacts of trade, one has to distinguish between impacts on 
tradeable, nontradeable or exportable industries –as the channels through which the China performance may affect 
(if any) their production may be different. The focus of this section is only on the impacts of manufacturing growth 
of Chinese exports to third parties on LAC exportable manufacture, not on FDI or TOT impacts related to China 
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To account for this China effect on manufacturing we use trade data and a simple 
approach that has been recently followed by the literature that seeks to measure trade impacts 
of the rise of China16: we look at what happened to market shares of manufacturing exports 
(imports by a key trade partner) in the 1990s and 2000s. To do so we construct an Index of 
Competitive Threat (ICT) (see Jenkins 2008b) as follows: 
 
𝐼𝐶𝑇(1) = ∑𝑥  𝐻𝑖
𝑡 ∗ 𝑘  𝐶𝑖
𝑡         (2) 
 
where 𝑥  𝐻𝑖
𝑡 = 𝑋  𝐻𝑖
𝑡 /𝑀  𝐻
𝑡   is the share of product i in total imports from country H by the 
destination market at time t, measuring the extent of competition faced by country H; and, 
𝑘  𝐶𝑖
𝑡 = 𝑋  𝐶𝑖
𝑡 /𝑀  𝐻
𝑡  is the share of China in total imports of product i by destination market at 
time t, measuring intensity of competition from China. 
Country H is each of the LACs in our sample. The destination market is a key market 
for LACs exports. We choose the USA as it has been on the top-five export markets, if not the 
top market, for each of the LACs during the period of study.17 We construct the indices for 
each country and year in our sample, by 3-digit ISIC.18 In turn we insert the indices and run the 
regressions taking the indices as an interaction term with the inflow boom dummy. Then if de-
industrialization is at work in the period under study due to China effect we would expect a 
reduction in the significant and negative coefficient of the interaction term made by the inflow 
boom variable and exportability along with a significant and negative coefficient of the 
interaction term between the inflow boom variable and the index of competitive threat. 
Before presenting the results of the regressions on value added growth we must look at 
the ICT results for LACs. In general, indices of competitive threat from China grew over time, 
but not for all countries all the time. The only country for which the ICT has grown 
continuously in the last 20 years, and that at the same time having the highest value, is Mexico 
(reaching 14.5 percent in 2010, and an average of 10.5 from 2000-2010). For most of the other 
countries the indices are low (at less than 4 percent), the exception being Brazil with an average 
                                                             
effects. After all, as pointed by Jenkins 2008a (p. 246), bilateral FDIs are small relative to trade so that balance of 
payment impacts should likely be dominated by trade impacts. In another section we try to deal with TOT effects 
on manufacturing. 
16 As mentioned by Mesquita Moreira (2007), the assessment of trade impacts may be a rather complex issue that 
may involve general equilibrium considerations and may face problems such as aggregation bias and product 
differentiation, more so for manufactures. Notwithstanding these concerns we believe that a simple approach may 
provide still valuable insights. 
17 Brazil is in fact also a key export market for MERCOSUR members (Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay – the 
last not being in our sample). But, the USA is also an important trade market for these countries. For the sake of 
uniformity, we choose the USA for all LACs. 
18 Trade data is either in SITC or HS nomenclature. We do a mapping using UN correspondences to construct the 
ITC(1) by ISIC. We use 3-digit, revision 3, to map the ICT(1) to our Value added data. 
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of 7.9 percent in the 2000s. These figures are largely in line with the conclusions of other 
research that studies LAC losses to China in the world markets; see for instance Mesquita 
Moreira (2007). This author also highlights differences in losses by type of manufacturing 
product: the higher losses are in low-tech labor-intensive goods, and within these goods 
footwear and apparel explain a great deal of the losses.19 
These four features of LAC market share losses to China in the past few years: (i) 
concentrated in Mexico, (ii) not widespread in the rest of LACs, (iii) concentrated in apparel 
and footwear, and (iv) greater in the 2000s, give us a lead as to what to expect in terms of the 
manufacturing industry growth impact of China in LACs. 
The regression results (Tables 13-15) show precisely these four effects: (i) there is a 
negative and significant impact of China on LAC manufacturing value added growth for the 
case of export booms, but only in the case of textiles, clothing, leather and footwear (see Table 
12, export boom, case 2, and compare with the same case in Table 6)20. For the rest of the 
inflow booms, the China effect is not significant or it is, but marginally (at the 10 percent), but 
with a positive sign. (ii) When including a dummy to capture the case of Mexico (Table 14), 
we find again the expected results. There is a significant negative impact on Mexican 
manufacturing growth due to competitive threat of China in both export boom cases: for all 
manufactures and more so for the low-tech manufactures, (iii) For the rest of LACs the China 
effect is actually positive, though smaller, during the export boom episodes, contributing thus 
to reduce the negative impact of the inflow booms on manufacturing value added growth 
(compare results in Table 13 and Table 6). (iv) Finally, if we look only at years 2000s (Table 
14), we find that the China effect actually compounds the negative impacts on manufacturing 
value added growth of the net inflows and has even more negative and significant impacts for 
Mexico but remain positive for the rest of LAC in the case of export booms and remittances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
19 As Mesquita Moreira points, the market share losses in apparel and other low-tech trade could have been higher 
in periods were distortions such as the Agreement of Textiles and Clothing (ATC) and LAC’s protection of its 
own in low-tech industries existed. 
20 We compare GMM regressions that use lags of the instrumented variable as instruments. 
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 Table 12.  Impact of China on LAC – third markets 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share -1.619 -2.781** -1.629 -2.804** -1.652 -3.035** -1.558 -2.814** 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -22.73***   -2.797   -20.57***   -8.911**   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -8.409*  3.887  -19.14***  7.302 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
-31.52  -37.89  -39.000  -41.550  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  -38.08   -60.43   -53.77   -45.3 
                  
Inflow boom*Index of 
competitive threat 
-592.3 -1,857** 509.8 -956.4 4,265* 4,159 10.44 -359.8 
         
Constant 12.050 13.540 11.420 11.740 9.013 -3.410 13.280 11.250 
         
Underidentification test 
Chi-sq(2) P-val 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
874.3 351.1 873.6 390.0 869.8 316.6 846.6 307.0 
Hansen test 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
0.350 0.917 0.352 0.996 0.406 0.721 0.325 0.768 
                 
Observations 3,575 2,814 3,575 2,814 3,575 2,814 3,575 2,814 
R-squared 0.059 0.059 0.050 0.058 0.061 0.065 0.051 0.058 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the GMM procedure. Lags of the instrumented variable are used as instruments. Standard errors are robust. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
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 Table 13. Impact of China on LAC – third markets (controlling for Mexico) 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share -2.043* -3.327** -1.760 -2.974** -1.194 -2.509* -1.650 -2.990** 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -21.69***   -2.215   -21.84***   -8.647**   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -11.52**  2.332  -14.27***  5.945 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
-30.79   -37.18   -40.2   -40.92   
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  -31.2   -56.51   -38.59   -46.69 
                  
Inflow boom*Index of 
competitive threat 
2,539*** 1,804*** 1,228 230.9 448.3 -359 525.9 571.5 
Inflow boom*Index of 
competitive threat*Mexico 
-9,011*** -10,311*** -3,209 -3,469 12,252* 11,997* -2,079 -3,403 
         
Constant 4.108 3.953 10.120 8.915 8.931 0.297 12.680 9.807 
         
Underidentification test 
Chi-sq(2) P-val 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
874.0 350.8 873.2 389.4 869.5 317.6 847.0 307.3 
Hansen test 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
0.350 0.945 0.339 0.947 0.463 0.801 0.316 0.758 
                 
Observations 3,575 2,814 3,575 2,814 3,575 2,814 3,575 2,814 
R-squared 0.064 0.066 0.051 0.059 0.076 0.079 0.051 0.059 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the GMM procedure. Lags of the instrumented variable are used as instruments. Standard errors are robust. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
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 Table 14. Impact of China on LAC – third markets over 2000s (controlling for Mexico) 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share -3.010** -3.006** -2.743* -2.738* -2.152 -2.270 -2.758* -2.775* 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -23.94***   -2.949   -19.87***   -6.38   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -12.02**  1.244  -13.33**  5.506 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
-88.57   -30.64   -38.1   -33.47   
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  0.854   18.97   -0.267   32.4 
                  
Inflow boom*Index of 
competitive threat 
2,722*** 1,980*** 905 766.50 1328.00 448.50 951.8** 670.5* 
Inflow boom*Index of 
competitive threat*Mexico 
-10,742*** -11,870*** -4,698* -4,706* 10,842* 10604 -4,774** -4,792** 
         
Constant -69.81*** -60.07*** -58.89*** -54.95*** -50.35*** -59.51*** -53.91*** -53.67*** 
         
Underidentification test 
Chi-sq(2) P-val 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
758.7 4,239.0 787.9 4,153.0 784.0 3,814.0 807.2 3,719.0 
Hansen test 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
0.079 0.290 0.258 0.722 0.464 0.793 0.210 0.955 
                 
Observations 2,515 2,515 2,515 2,515 2,515 2,515 2,515 2,515 
R-squared 0.079 0.072 0.062 0.062 0.087 0.081 0.064 0.063 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the GMM procedure. Lags of the instrumented variable are used as instruments. Standard errors are robust. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
   
 
6. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper has been to investigate if and how different episodes of large net 
inflows – export boom, remittances, FDIs, or aid – caused Dutch disease in Latin American 
countries. We investigate this disease – i.e. the decline of manufacturing output – with special 
reference to the channel through which it works, to the crisis period and to the role of China 
for LAC. Our results robustly suggest that export, aid and remittances booms may indeed have 
an adverse impact on the relative growth of exportable industries.  
The evidence suggests that the exchange rate overvaluation is the channel through 
which these inflow booms induced decline of manufacturing output, but only after the work of 
economic policies has been considered. Results suggest that it is likely that monetary policy 
counteracted any appreciation pressures on the foreign-exchange market by providing the 
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needed domestic liquidity and accumulating reserves. This has been likely done to prevent the 
adverse effects excess appreciation may inflict onto the domestic economy, but also to sustain 
the rigid forms of the exchange rate where applicable. The crisis likely softened the Dutch 
disease effects in LAC, as the declining effect for manufacturing stopped after 2008. The latter 
has been even expected, given that at least in nominal terms, many LAC currencies depreciated 
or faced devaluations at the onset or during the crisis (see Figure A1 in Appendix 4). As for 
the role of China, we document that its manufacture exports to some of the LAC does not 
significantly affect the manufacturing growth of other fellow LAC, but China plays a positive 
role for LAC’s manufacturing through the work on third-market competition once the effect of 
Mexico has been controlled for. On the contrary, the China effect for Mexican manufacturing 
industries is clearly negative during the inflow booms. We thus provide empirical evidence of 
a long suspected, but unaccounted for, impact of China in LAC manufactures. 
The message from these findings is that LAC countries should likely maintain their eye 
on the exchange rates, in terms of the management of their overvaluation – e.g. by purchasing 
foreign exchange and/or easing monetary policy. At least in the context of manufacturing 
output, this proved important, as it likely softens the negative work of the exchange rate 
overvaluation for manufacturing. Also, keeping an eye on trade with China and the type of 
manufactures and markets LAC has to compete with China on third markets may actually bring 
benefits for LAC, or at least may preserve the current favorable position of some LAC 
(excluding Mexico) manufacturing industry performance. 
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Annex 1 – Variables definitions and sources 
Variable Description Source 
VA growth Annual average rate of growth of 
value added in industry i in country 
j over the relevant period. 
UNIDO 
Initial Industry Share Industry i’s share in country j’s 
total manufacturing value added at 
the beginning of the decade. 
Calculated based on VA growth 
Inflow  boom Export, remittances, aid, FDIs. Export data and FDI data from ECLAC, 
CEPALSTAT. Aid and Remittances from the 
World Bank, WDI.  
Boom is defined as a dummy variable taking 
a value of 1 if the observation in that 
particular year exceeds a linear trend, and 
zero otherwise. 
Exportability index 1 A dummy that takes a value of 1 if 
industry i has a ratio of exports to 
value that exceeds the industry 
median value. 
 
COMTRADE and UNIDO data (to estimate 
export shares by industry) and several 
correspondences between HS, SITC (which 
are the product classifications used in 
COMTRADE data) and ISIC (which is the 
industry classification used by UNIDO) 
Exportability index 2 A dummy that takes a value of 1 if 
industry is textiles, clothing, 
leather or footwear. 
UNIDO classification data  
Crisis dummy A dummy taking a value of 1 if 
after the crisis hit (with annual data 
after 2008). 
Self-defined 
Excess appreciation Deviation of the actual relative 
price level from an estimated one 
(when regressing price level on 
real GDP per capita in PPP terms). 
Authors’ calculations based on WDI World 
Bank and ECLAC data (see Annex 2). 
Financial dependence The measure of external financial 
dependence for all firms in 
industry i. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998), Table 1. 
Ratio of 
manufacturing 
imports from China 
to total 
manufacturing 
import 
Imports of manufactures in ISIC 
classification (according to 
correspondence between trade and 
industry data) from China divided 
by imports of manufactures from 
World (including China). 
COMTRADE and UNIDO data (to estimate 
import ratios by industry) and several 
correspondences between HS, SITC (which 
are the product classifications used in 
COMTRADE data) and ISIC (which is the 
industry classification used by UNIDO) 
Money Logarithm of the broad money 
(money plus quasi-money). 
IFS data from the IMF 
Foreign reserves Total Reserves excluding Gold 
(USD), in log terms 
IFS data from the IMF 
Interest rates Money market interest rate, except 
for Chile, Panama, and Ecuador. 
For Chile is the policy relevant 
interest rate. For Panama is the 
lending interest rate, and for 
Ecuador is the discount rate. 
IFS data from the IMF 
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Fiscal balance 
(deficit/surplus) 
Central government operations, 
global result, as a percentage of 
GDP. 
Data from ECLAC  
Changes in terms of 
trade 
Net barter terms of trade index is 
calculated as the percentage ratio 
of the export unit value indexes to 
the import unit value indexes, 
measured relative to the base year 
2000. 
The World Development Indicators 
Exchange rate regime 1 = fixed (currency board, 
dollarization) 
2 = conventional pegs 
3 = managed float (and bands) 
4 = free float 
Data set from Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008). 
http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-
by-topic/topics/11/ 
Index of Competitive 
Threat (ICT) 
The ICT accounts for the loss of 
market share by a LAC country to 
China in manufacturing products 
(See Jenkins 2008b). 
Own calculations using data from 
COMTRADE. 
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Annex 2 - Measuring Overvaluation of the RER for LAC Countries 
An excess appreciation of the real exchange rate (RER) could be a channel that might explain 
the negative impacts of episodes of booming exports, aid, or remittances, on tradable 
(exportable) manufacturing industries. How much, if at all, a RER is overvalued is an empirical 
question that many studies have addressed in different ways. A common step in all of them is 
to have a measure of an equilibrium exchange rate from which over (or under) valuation can 
be calculated as the difference between the actual RER and the equilibrium RER. Thus, the 
differences in estimated over or undervaluation of the RER lay essentially on how to measure 
the equilibrium RER from a given proposed measure of RER.  The purpose of this annex is not 
to evaluate alternative measures of overvaluation (or undervaluation), nor is it to discuss about 
alternative measures of equilibrium RER. For this the reader is referred to the literature (see 
for instance Isard 2007 for an assessment of methodologies to estimate equilibrium RER). 
For the purpose of having a measure of excess appreciation in our study of Dutch 
disease we propose to follow Johnson, Ostry and Subramanian (2007). These authors estimate 
overvaluation as the difference between the actual RER and a predicted RER (estimated from 
a Balassa-Samuelson-like cross-section regression). The predicted RER, which according to 
Johnson et al. constitutes a sort of equilibrium real exchange rate, is estimated running a 
regression of the log of the ratio of a country’s price level (CPIs) to that of the US on the 
country’s per capita GDP in PPP terms. Somewhat similar methodology of estimation is found 
in Frankel (2005), cited in turn in Johnson et al. (2007). Frankel uses the ratio of GDP deflators: 
GDP/GDP us. Other studies use PPI (producer price index).  The idea being that these price 
ratios capture a concept of RER.   
A key idea behind this methodology is to control for the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis: 
the relatively fast growing countries experience relatively rapid productivity growth in the 
tradables sector accompanied by relatively large increases in the ratio of nontradables prices to 
tradable prices (thus the implied comparison between two countries).  That is, the tendency is 
for a RER constructed from aggregate national prices to appreciate over time for relatively fast 
growing (richer) countries and depreciate for relatively slow growing countries; see Isard 2007. 
Isard points that the national indices should reflect the prices of both tradables and 
nontradables. 
In our study the RER is obtained as the ratio of a country’s CPI (from Latin American 
and the Caribbean and OECD, 60 in total) to the CPI of the United States, and we take the 
logarithm (natural) of this value and regress it against the log of the real per capita GDP in PPP 
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terms (base year is 2005). We estimate a cross-section regression for every year in the period 
1992-2010 for the sample of countries as follows: 
 
ln RERi = α + β ln GDPpcPPPi + ei.  
 
where i stands for country (the subscript for time has been omitted). 
The measure of overvaluation or excess appreciation (if any) is the difference between 
the actual RER and the predicted:  
 
excessi = ln RERi – (α hat + β hat ln GDPpcPPPi) 
 
In other words the difference between the actual ln RER and the estimated RER (or ln 
RER hat) gives a measure of the excess appreciation (overvaluation, or, if in the opposite case, 
undervaluation). We calculate three different excess appreciation measures: (i) excessit taking 
each overvaluation obtained, one for each year for each country, (ii) excessi taking an average 
overvaluation measure for the entire period, that is, one for each country, and (iii) excess i
decade 
taking an average overvaluation for the 1990s and another for the 2000s, that is, two measures 
for each country. 
As an alternative measure of RER we calculate a bilateral RER.21 This RER is a trade 
weighted RER constructed using the top five bilateral trade partners and as weights the share 
of total trade (imports plus exports) of each partner on total trade with the world: CPI i  / [CPI 
f1* Trade f1/Trade w  +  CPI f2 * Trade f2/Trade w + … CPI f5 * Trade f5/Trade w].  Alternatively, 
another bilateral RER uses as weights the share of total trade of each top-five trade partner on 
total trade of the five trade partners.22 
Results. Using the CPI ratios as the measure of RER, the regressions show evidence of 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect in cross-section: the richer the country the more appreciated the 
RER (beta coefficients are, in general, positive and significant). However after 2005 the effect 
is opposite (See Annex 2, Table A1).  It is the case that some countries do have overvaluation 
of their RER while other have undervaluation. Figure A1 shows these countries, those that have 
an excess appreciation of the RER are those whose observations are above the line. We see that 
                                                             
21 The bilateral RER is calculated only for the sample of Latin American Countries for which we study DD 
impacts on value added growth. 
22 In what follows the results are based only on the CPI i/CPI us measure. Excess appreciation estimation using the 
two bilateral RER delivered coefficients that were not significant. 
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overvaluation was present among several (but not all) Latin American countries during the 
1990s, and early 2000s. However in the late 2000s, although there are still some countries 
where overvaluation can be seen, the regressions do not provide evidence of the Balassa-
Samuelson relation. 
 
Figure A1. Fitted values and ln RER, LAC countries, Selected Years 
  
  
 
Source: Own estimations. 
Note: The regressions show evidence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in cross-section: the richer the country 
the more appreciated the RER. However after 2005 the effect is opposite (See this annex, Table 1).  The graphs 
above show countries with an excess appreciation of the RER: see those observations above the line. 
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Table A1. RER regressions for Latin American and Caribbean, and OECD countries,  
cross-section regressions for each year in period 1992-2010. 
Dependent Variable: ln RER 
Year 
Number 
of obs 
Coef. of real 
GDP PPP pc Std. Err. t P>|t| 
1992 60 0.6211*** 0.2088 2.97 0.004 
1993 60 0.5345*** 0.1704 3.14 0.003 
1994 60 0.4213*** 0.1256 3.35 0.001 
1995 60 0.3433*** 0.1040 3.3 0.002 
1996 60 0.2967*** 0.0892 3.33 0.002 
1997 60 0.2592*** 0.0766 3.38 0.001 
1998 60 0.2256*** 0.0635 3.55 0.001 
1999 60 0.1902*** 0.0464 4.1 0.000 
2000 60 0.1464*** 0.0330 4.43 0.000 
2001 60 0.1187*** 0.0252 4.71 0.000 
2002 60 0.1000*** 0.0186 5.39 0.000 
2003 60 0.0601*** 0.0105 5.74 0.000 
2004 60 0.0234*** 0.0040 5.91 0.000 
2005 60 (omitted)       
2006 60 -0.0200*** 0.0041 -4.94 0.000 
2007 60 -0.0403*** 0.0075 -5.39 0.000 
2008 60 -0.0747*** 0.0126 -5.91 0.000 
2009 60 -0.0838*** 0.0182 -4.62 0.000 
2010 60 -0.0981*** 0.0234 -4.19 0.00 
Source: Own estimations. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Notes: Real Exchange rate (RER) is calculated as the ratio of Consumer Price Index (CPI) for each country to 
that of the US. The regressions show evidence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in cross-section: the richer the 
country the more appreciated the RER. However, after 2005 the sign of the GDP coefficients reverse. 
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Annex 3 – The effects of policies (separately) 
 Table A2.  Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: The role of money 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share 78.11*** 47.13*** 69.74*** 46.33*** 63.76** 45.67*** 66.10*** 48.05*** 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -24.60***   2.472   -17.00***   -3.217   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -12.90***  7.677  -11.67***  9.142** 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
-45   -49.01   -50.27   -50.38   
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  1.907   -1.206   0.267   9.142** 
                  
Log of broad money 53.85*** 34.09*** 43.83*** 32.66** 38.38** 32.14** 40.24** 34.15*** 
         
Constant -1,407*** -887.4*** -1,149** -851.1** -1,001** -837.4** -1,051** -890.7*** 
         
Underidentification test 
Chi-sq(2) P-val 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
790.9 8,684.0 803.9 9,401.0 790.4 8,719.0 783.6 8,607.0 
Hansen test 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
0.828 0.166 0.806 0.304 0.863 0.217 0.786 0.539 
                 
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 
R-squared 0.062 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.058 0.054 0.053 0.054 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the GMM procedure. Lags of the instrumented variable are used as instruments. Standard errors are robust. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
 
  
44 
 
 Table A3  Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: The role of interest rate 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share 20.01** 9.770* 23.56** 10.34** 23.14** 10.24* 23.55** 10.41** 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -22.25***   -1.415   -13.10***   -6.897*   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -10.21**  6.542  -11.81***  6.684 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
-55.69   -64.56   -65.09   -67.42   
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  -1.58    -4.245   -2.758   6.684 
                  
Interest rate -0.496*** -0.207 -0.544*** -0.209 -0.526*** -0.205 -0.534*** -0.212 
         
Constant 10.420 12.010 10.860 11.640 16.80** 12.010 11.770 11.750 
         
Underidentification test 
Chi-sq(2) P-val 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
636.1 9,042.0 646.9 9,699.0 638.8 9,054.0 628.1 8,968.0 
Hansen test 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
0.615 0.062 0.622 0.119 0.660 0.065 0.605 0.188 
                 
Observations 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 
R-squared 0.059 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.054 0.052 0.052 0.051 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the GMM procedure. Lags of the instrumented variable are used as instruments. Standard errors are robust. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
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 Table A4.  Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: The role of official reserves 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share 49.20** 52.07*** 56.78*** 51.64*** 47.52** 51.64*** 60.54*** 51.74*** 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -22.19***   -1.332   -12.48***   -7.843**   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -10.42**  5.8  -11.42***  5.142 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
-32.63   -39.29   -40.55   -43.17   
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  5.718   2.994   4.345   5.142 
                  
Log of foreign reserves 10.24* 13.39** 11.63** 13.06** 8.756 13.09** 12.80** 13.07** 
         
Constant -247.1* -324.6** -281.4** -316.7** -203.600 -317.3** -310.0** -316.8** 
         
Underidentification test 
Chi-sq(2) P-val 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
926.1 9,387.0 934.8 10,065.0 927.1 9,405.0 904.1 9,309.0 
Hansen test 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
0.615 0.149 0.623 0.260 0.654 0.164 0.608 0.363 
                 
Observations 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 
R-squared 0.060 0.053 0.052 0.052 0.054 0.053 0.052 0.052 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the GMM procedure. Lags of the instrumented variable are used as instruments. Standard errors are robust. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
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 Table A5.  Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: The role of government budget 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share 9.875*** 9.311** 8.759** 9.158** 4.423 8.917** 6.802* 9.297** 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -23.42***   -3.125   -13.75***   -8.192*   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -9.549**  3.586  -11.06***  5.684 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
-37.3   -47.3   -47.92   -52.49   
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  -2.115   -7.15   -4.333   5.684 
                  
Budget balance to GDP 1.698 0.561 0.729 0.456 1.153 0.564 0.311 0.530 
         
Constant 13.380 13.300 12.480 12.850 19.36** 13.340 12.920 13.080 
         
Underidentification test 
Chi-sq(2) P-val 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
833.1 7,587.0 838.9 8,668.0 832.9 7,785.0 788.2 7,792.0 
Hansen test 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
0.580 0.092 0.616 0.184 0.632 0.110 0.602 0.262 
                 
Observations 3,724 3,724 3,724 3,724 3,724 3,724 3,724 3,724 
R-squared 0.060 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.054 0.052 0.052 0.052 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the GMM procedure. Lags of the instrumented variable are used as instruments. Standard errors are 
robust. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
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 Table A6.  Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: The role of terms of trade 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share 16.53* 10.57** 20.65** 11.19** 20.37** 11.04** 21.18** 11.24** 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -23.46***   -0.174   -13.21***   -7.564*   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -10.15**  6.992  -11.89***  6.227 
                  
Excess appreciation*Exportability1 -30.59   -39.58   -40.87   -44.26   
Excess appreciation*Exportability2   3.978   1.283   2.724   6.227 
                  
Terms of trade 0.133 -0.020 -0.062 -0.043 -0.028 -0.028 -0.123 -0.026 
         
Constant -6.556 14.520 18.810 16.990 20.500 15.520 27.57* 14.980 
         
Underidentification test 
Chi-sq(2) P-val 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
896.8 9,367.0 917.1 10,065.0 901.7 9,384.0 870.1 9,280.0 
Hansen test 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
0.583 0.099 0.597 0.176 0.636 0.105 0.584 0.267 
                 
Observations 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 
R-squared 0.059 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.053 0.051 0.051 0.051 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the GMM procedure. Lags of the instrumented variable are used as instruments. Standard errors are robust. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
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 Table A7.  Impact of capital inflows on manufacturing growth: The role of exchange rate regimes 
Dependent variable is annual rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j  
  Export boom FDI boom Aid boom Remittances boom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial share 32.10** 17.26** 40.83*** 18.07** 38.88*** 17.66** 40.31*** 18.39** 
         
Inflow boom*Exportability1 -21.43***   -1.414   -12.71***   -6.785*   
Inflow boom*Exportability2  -9.723**  6.455  -11.44***  6.959 
                  
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability1 
-48.86   -61.17   -60.72   -63.86   
Excess 
appreciation*Exportability2 
  -0.918   -3.557   -2.031   6.959 
                  
Exchange rate regime -6.547* -3.823 -9.045*** -3.972 -8.320** -3.805 -8.788*** -4.113 
         
Constant 17.32** 16.00* 20.36** 15.81* 25.36*** 15.99* 20.98*** 16.08* 
         
Underidentification test 
Chi-sq(2) P-val 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
675.3 9,122.0 693.2 9,798.0 686.4 9,142.0 674.7 9,064.0 
Hansen test 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 
0.697 0.094 0.747 0.165 0.775 0.098 0.725 0.258 
                 
Observations 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,890 
R-squared 0.059 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.054 0.052 0.052 0.052 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates are based on the GMM procedure. Lags of the instrumented variable are used as instruments. Standard errors are robust. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other notes as in Table 5. 
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Annex 4 – Nominal Exchange Rate developments 
 
Figure A1.- Nominal Exchange Rate against US dollar, 2008-2009 
 
 
Source: Statistics from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and own calculations.  
Note: July 2008=100. 
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Annex 5 – Boom periods 
 
 Table A8 – Export boom periods per country per year 
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1992        1   
1993 0       1   
1994 0      0 1   
1995 1 1  1  1 1 1 1  
1996 1 0 1 1  1 1 1 1  
1997 1 0 1 1  1 1 1 0  
1998 1 0 0 0  0 1 1 0 1 
1999 0 0 0 0  0 1 1 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  1 0 
2002 0  0 0 0 0 1  1 0 
2003   0 0 0 0 0  1 0 
2004   0 0 0 0 1  1 0 
2005   1 1 0 1 1  0 0 
2006   1 1 0 1 1  1 1 
2007   1 1 1 1 1   1 
2008   1 1 1 1 0    
2009   0  1  0    
2010   1  1  0    
Source: Drafted by the authors 
 
  
51 
 
Table A9 – FDI booms per country per year 
 
 
 
A
rg
en
ti
n
a
 
B
o
li
v
ia
 
B
ra
zi
l 
C
h
il
e 
C
o
lu
m
b
ia
 
E
cu
a
d
o
r 
M
ex
ic
o
 
P
a
n
a
m
a
 
P
er
u
 
U
ru
g
u
a
y
 
1992        0   
1993 0       0   
1994 0      0 0   
1995 0 0  0  0 0 0 1  
1996 1 0 0 1  0 0 1 1  
1997 0 1 1 1  1 0 1 0  
1998 0 1 1 0  1 0 0 0 1 
1999 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 1 
2000 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2001 0 0 1 0 0 0 1  0 0 
2002 0  0 0 0 1 1  0 0 
2003   0 0 0 1 1  1 0 
2004   0 1 0 1 1  1 0 
2005   0 0 1 0 1  1 0 
2006   0 0 1 0 0  1 1 
2007   1 1 1 0 1   1 
2008   1 1 1 1 1    
2009   1  0  0    
2010   1  0  0    
Source: Drafted by the authors 
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Table A10- Aid booms per country per year 
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1992        1   
1993 1       0   
1994 0      1 0   
1995 0 0  1  1 1 0 0  
1996 0 1 1 1  1 1 1 0  
1997 0 1 1 1  0 0 0 1  
1998 0 0 1 0  0 0 0 1 1 
1999 0 0 0 0  0 0 1 1 1 
2000 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
2001 1 1 0 0 0 0 0  1 0 
2002 1  0 0 0 1 0  1 0 
2003   0 0 1 0 0  0 1 
2004   0 0 0 0 0  1 1 
2005   0 1 0 1 1  1 0 
2006   0 1 1 0 1  0 1 
2007   1 1 0 1 0   1 
2008   1 1 1 1 0    
2009   1  1  1    
2010   1  0  1    
Source: Drafted by the authors 
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Table A11 – Remittances booms per country per year 
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1992        0   
1993 1       1   
1994 1      1 1   
1995 1 0  0  1 1 1 1  
1996 0 0 1 0  1 0 0 1  
1997 0 1 1 0  1 0 0 0  
1998 0 1 0 0  0 0 0 0 1 
1999 0 0 0 0  1 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
2001 1 0 0 1 0 0 0  0 0 
2002 1  0 1 0 0 0  1 0 
2003   1 1 1 0 1  1 1 
2004   1 1 1 0 1  1 1 
2005   0 1 0 1 1  1 1 
2006   1 0 1 1 1  1 0 
2007   1 0 1 1 1   0 
2008   1 0 1 0 1    
2009   0  0  0    
2010   0  0  0    
Source: Drafted by the authors 
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Annex 6 – Summary statistics and panel used 
 
Table A12 – Summary statistics of all included variables 
 
 Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Growth of manufacturing value added 5045 10.09 139.88 (126.1) 7,426.6 
Export boom 5719 0.50 0.50 0 1 
FDI boom 5719 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Aid boom 5719 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Remittance boom 5719 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Exportability1 5719 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Exportability2 5719 0.13 0.33 0 1 
External dependence on capital 5716 0.40 0.38 (0.45) 1.49 
Initial share in manufacturing value added 5629 1.47 2.47 0.00 28.52 
Excess appreciation 5719 (0.01) 0.36 (1.66) 1.21 
Log of broad money 5412 26.64 2.97 21.67 32.29 
Interest rate 5719 14.26 13.82 1.24 86.10 
Log of foreign reserves 5719 23.19 1.54 20.04 26.38 
Exchange rate regime 5719 3.06 1.11 1.00 4.00 
Terms of trade changes 5719 106.84 18.35 80.56 189.46 
Government balance to GDP 5357 (1.43) 2.15 (5.07) 7.80 
 
 
 
Table A13  Unbalanced panel, periods and number of years 
Country Periods of Value Added data available Number of years 
Argentina 1993-2002 10 
Bolivia  1995-2001 7 
Brazil 1996-2010 15 
Chile 1995-2008 14 
Colombia 2000-2010 11 
Ecuador 1995-2008 14 
Mexico 1989, 1994-2010 17 
Panama 1992-2001 10 
Peru 1995-96; 2001-2010 12 
Uruguay 1998-2005; 2007-2008 10 
AVERAGE  12 
MEDIAN  12 
Source: UNIDO  
Notes: Number of years for Mexico excludes year 1989.  Data for Peru 
includes years 1995-1996, see gap in year 1997. For Uruguay, there is a gap 
in year 2006. 
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Table A14  Unbalanced panel, sectors and number of years    
ISIC Description 
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151 Processed meat,fish,fruit,vegetables,fats 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 10 121 
152 Dairy products 10 7 15 14 11 14 14 9 12 9 117 
153 Grain mill products; starches; animal feeds 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 9 120 
154 Other food products 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 9 120 
155 Beverages 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 9 120 
160 Tobacco products 10 7 15 0 11 14 17 6 7 10 99 
171 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 0 12 10 112 
172 Other textiles 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 1 12 9 111 
173 Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 10 7 15 14 11 14 14 9 12 9 115 
181 Wearing apparel, except fur apparel 10 7 15 14 11 13 17 9 12 10 120 
182 Dressing & dyeing of fur; processing of fur 1 0 0 0 3 11 1 0 12 0 28 
191 Tanning, dressing and processing of leather 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 10 121 
192 Footwear 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 9 118 
201 Sawmilling and planing of wood 10 7 15 14 11 14 8 8 12 10 111 
202 Products of wood, cork, straw, etc. 1 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 9 111 
210 Paper and paper products 10 7 15 1 11 14 17 9 12 10 108 
221 Publishing 10 7 12 14 11 14 10 9 12 10 111 
222 Printing and related service activities 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 0 111 
223 Reproduction of recorded media 1 7 15 6 0 2 10 0 2 8 51 
231 Coke oven products 10 0 15 4 2 0 10 0 2 3 46 
232 Refined petroleum products 10 7 15 0 11 14 17 6 12 9 101 
233 Processing of nuclear fuel 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
241 Basic chemicals 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 8 12 10 120 
242 Other chemicals 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 9 120 
243 Man-made fibers 10 1 15 10 4 4 17 0 12 0 73 
56 
 
251 Rubber products 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 10 120 
252 Plastic products 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 9 120 
261 Glass and glass products 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 10 121 
269 Non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 9 120 
271 Basic iron and steel 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 7 12 6 115 
272 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 0 109 
273 Casting of metals 10 7 15 0 2 13 13 0 12 0 72 
281 Struct.metal products;tanks;steam generators 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 10 121 
289 Other metal products; metal working services 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 9 12 9 120 
291 General purpose machinery 10 7 15 14 11 13 17 1 12 10 112 
292 Special purpose machinery 10 7 15 14 11 11 17 1 12 9 107 
293 Domestic appliances n.e.c. 10 4 15 14 11 14 14 0 12 9 103 
300 Office, accounting and computing machinery 10 0 15 1 3 1 17 0 12 9 68 
311 Electric motors, generators and transformers 10 4 15 14 11 14 17 1 12 8 106 
312 Electricity distribution & control apparatus 1 7 12 14 11 14 8 0 12 0 81 
313 Insulated wire and cable 10 7 12 14 11 13 17 0 12 0 96 
314 Accumulators, primary cells and batteries 10 7 15 10 11 14 14 0 12 0 93 
315 Lighting equipment and electric lamps 1 7 15 14 11 14 17 1 12 0 92 
319 Other electrical equipment n.e.c. 1 0 15 14 11 12 14 0 12 0 79 
321 Electronic valves, tubes, etc. 10 0 15 14 11 0 17 0 11 7 85 
322 TV/radio transmitters; line comm. apparatus 1 0 15 5 10 12 17 0 12 0 72 
323 TV and radio receivers and associated goods 10 0 15 9 11 8 17 0 12 0 82 
331 Medical, measuring, testing appliances, etc. 10 5 15 14 11 13 16 1 6 7 98 
332 Optical instruments & photographic equipment 1 7 15 14 11 14 17 0 6 0 86 
333 Watches and clocks 1 0 12 14 0 0 1 0 6 0 34 
341 Motor vehicles 10 0 15 14 11 14 17 0 12 8 101 
342 Automobile bodies, trailers & semi-trailers 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 1 8 0 99 
343 Parts/accessories for automobiles 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 1 12 0 101 
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 10 0 15 14 11 14 17 1 12 10 105 
352 Railway/tramway locomotives & rolling stock 10 1 15 5 0 0 17 0 10 0 58 
57 
 
353 Aircraft and spacecraft 1 0 15 14 11 0 3 0 10 2 56 
359 Transport equipment n.e.c. 10 1 15 14 11 13 17 0 12 9 102 
361 Furniture 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 1 12 10 113 
369 Manufacturing n.e.c. 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 1 12 9 112 
371 Recycling of metal waste and scrap 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 15 
372 Recycling of non-metal waste and scrap 0 0 12 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 15 
 Total 491 303 869 681 563 685 882 235 646 364 5,777 
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 Number of years 10 7 15 14 11 14 17 10 12 10  
 Average Industries per year 49 43 58 49 51 49 52 24 54 36  
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 Source: UNIDO.             
 Note: Each time an industry appears it represents a year. For instance, for Brazil most industries (on average 58, out of 61 possible) appear 
throughout the 15 years of the data available for this country (1996-2010) . 
 
 
